Assessing the Eschatological Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg (2)

“Universal history” – this is the key term in Pannenberg’s understanding of the relationship between history and eschatology. Here, he seeks to convey the idea that eschatology brings unity to history, which is fragmented by contradictions. In Pannenberg’s thought, we may regard the relationship between eschatology and history as a parallel to the relationship between Kingdom and Church.

“Universal history” – this term is derived from Hegel (J. M. Robinson, “Revelation as Word and History” in Theology as History, edited by J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb Jr., (1967), p. 63).

Pannenberg is not uncritical of Hegel. he contends that Hegel failed to see the element of openness in the future (Basic questions in Theology, Vol. II, ( 1971), p. 24; Revelation as History, edited by Pannenberg, (1968), p. 18; The Idea of God and Human Freedom (USA) / Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. III (UK), (1973), pp. 174, 177).

He is critical of a pantheistic tendency in Hegel. In Pannenberg’s view, the charge of pantheism is “(t)he most effective theological charge against hegel’s philosophy” (The Idea of God and Human Freedom, p. 160). In making this comment, pannenberg points out that “Hegel defended himself against the charge of pantheism … repeatedly and explicitly defend(ing) his philosophy against that label” (p. 161). In his discussion of the pantheistic tendency in Hegel’s thought (pp. 160 ff.), Pannenberg is clearly dissatisfied with both the notion that Hegel’s thought is pantheistic and the development of Hegel’s thought in a pantheistic direction by “the Hegelian left wing … (which) more or less openly professed pantheism” (p. 161). In Pannenberg’s view, Hegel need not be interpreted pantheistically. It is the pantheistic interpretation of Hegel which developed “from the time of D. F. Strauss onwards” (p. 161) from which Pannenberg is particularly concerned to dissociate himself.

A significant difference between Pannenberg and Hegel is highlighted in Pannenberg’s quite unHegelian affirmation of the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus as an act of the personal God. It is important to understand that “(w)hen Hegel avails himself of Christian categories, he never implies acceptance of the Christian faith in the supernatural, in miracles, or in the incarnation and resurrection; he merely finds the Christian myths more suggestive and appropriate anticipations of his philosophy than the myths of other religions” (W. Kaufmann, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts and Commentary, (1966 – first published, 1965), p. 274). Pannenberg adopts an entirely unHegelian stance when he writes, “the assertion that Jesus is risen … implies an historical claim, because it is the assertion of a particular pastevent; and with such an assertion it lays itself open to historical enquiry and examination … Consequently Christianity will have to get used to the fact that the basic assertion of its faith will remain a matter of dispute in this world” (The Apostles’ Creed in the Light of Today’s Questions, (1972), p. 114). In view of Pannenberg’s emphasis on the inseparability of fact and meaning, M. Westphal contends that, despite his admiration of and indebtedness to Hegel, “Pannenberg may well be the most articulate anti-Hegelian since Kierkegaard” (”Hegel, Pannenberg and Hermeneutics” in Man and World, Vol. 4, No. 3, August 1971, pp. 276-293).

Recognizing the significant differences between Pannenberg and Hegel, we must also note that Pannenberg is consistent in huis basic appreciation of Hegel’s understanding of universal history (Revelation as History, pp. 16-17; Basic questions in Theology, Vol, II, pp. 21 ff.). It is important to note the way in which Pannenberg uses the concept of “universal history.” For Pannenberg, the language of apocalyptic is to be understood in terms of “the expectation of the end of history as a future event” ( A. D. Galloway, Wolfhart Pannenberg, (1973), p. 73, n.5). Pannenberg sees apocalyptic language as symbolic “in the sense that we have no direct experience of it (the reality to which apocalyptic language points) and therefore no resources out of which we can picture or imagine it literally” (p. 72, brackets mine). This understanding of the symbolic function of apocalyptic language, as it points toward the world’s future, requires to be carefully distinguished from a symbolic interpretation which sees the universality of apocalyptic language not in terms of the world’s future but solely in terms of a particular understanding of man’s existemtial experience.

While Pannenberg has been critical of hegel, there remains a great respect for him. This respect is expressed in his analysis of “The Significance of Christianity in the Philosophy of Hegel” (The Idea of God and Human Freedom, Chapter 5, pp. 144-177), where he writes, “How can we explain why the Christian religion and theology treated Hegel with so much mistrust and reserve? Even Karl Barth asks in astonishment (though not without ironically disassociating himself from the nineteenth century as a whole, since he believed his theology had gone beyond the outlook of that century): ‘Why did Hegel not become for the Protestant world something similar to what Thomas Aquinas was for Roman Catholicism?’” (p. 160. For Pannenberg’s answer to this question, see pp. 160 ff.).)

In view of Pannenberg’s critical treatment of Hegel, he cannot be simply classed as a “Hegelian”. Pannenberg’s position can be described as “a re-establishment of the Hegelian marriage of theology, philosophy and universal history … with a difference!” (A. D. Galloway, “The New Hegelians” in Religious Studies, 8, December 1972, p. 371), since Pannenberg uses “post-Hegelian concepts” (A. D. Galloway, Wolfhart Pannenberg, p. 64).

The idea of “universal history” may represent a valid development from the Christian confession of faith in God as the Lord of history, if it is taken to mean that there is ultimate meaning in history from the divine perspective. Pannenberg’s use of the concept of “universal history”, to move from the election of the Church to a universal Kingdom, is not, however, at all self-evident. To build a theology which revolves around a universal Kingdom goes beyond the mere affirmation of “universal history”, in the sense of ultimate meaning history, to a pronouncement about what that “universal history” must mean (In my first post in this series, I referred to Pannenberg’s that his view of the Kingdom of God is not “merely a formalistic idea about God’s ruling over everybody and everything” (Theology and the Kingdom of God, (1975), p. 78) with the comment that while Pannenberg may dissociate himself from a superficial interpretation of universalism, it remains very difficult to see how his position really differs from universalism.)

We need to distinguish between (a) a theological construction which is the result of a particular idea of the Kingdom of God dominating a whole theology; and (b) a believing confession of the reality of the Kingdom of God.

The question regarding Pannenberg’s eschatological theology concerns whether he has speculated beyond the believing confession and moved toward making statements which emerge from his own philosophical approach rather from adherence to the Scriptures (In my first post in this series, I raised a question concerning Pannenberg’s notion of an eternal concurrence between resurrection and judgment, suggesting that while it fits in well with his notion of a universal Kingdom of God, it may not fit in so well with other aspects of the Gospel proclamation – the urgent call to faith and the stern warning against judgment, I ended that article with some general comments about “the Gospel we are called to preach“. These comments are based on John 3:16-18. As well as the God’s love for the whole world (v. 16) and the God’s purpose for the whole world (v. 17), there needs to be, in our preaching, also a significant emphasis on God’s warning to the whole world (v. 18, also v. 36). The question we need to ask regarding Pannenberg’s eschatological theology is this – Does he take us beyond “the Gospel we are called to preach” towards a speculative approach which plays down the importance of preaching God’s warning to the whole world?)